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The 1997 handover of Hong Kong from theUnited Kingdom to the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) stands as one of the major political
transformations of the twentieth century. After
150 years of British rule, the handover ceded
sovereignty of a territory of 426 square miles, 6.4
million persons, and an economy of HK$1,218 bil-
lion to the formally socialist Chinese government.
The transfer took place within the structure of
the Basic Law governing the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, which promised in Article
5 that, “The socialist system and policies shall
not be practiced in the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region, and the previous capitalist
system and way of life shall remain unchanged,
for 50 years.”
Since the handover, Hong Kong has been
scrutinized from many corners—from political
activists, to journalists, to economists, to diplo-
mats, to its neighbors and statist competitors.
Almost everyone, it seems, wants to know what
happened in Hong Kong and how the handover
has changed social and economic life in the terri-
tory (Ash et al. 2003). This was especially true
in 2007 and 2012, dates that marked a decade
and a decade and a half, respectively, of living un-
der the vague autonomy signified by the Chinese
dictum, “one nation, two systems.”1
Despite many informative inquiries about
Hong Kong’s post-handover experiences, little
empirical research has systematically examined
the impact of the political transformation on
business dynamics, and none has investigated its
impact on the formation and operation of new
businesses in the territory. Because the vital-
ity of a capitalist system depends heavily on its
underlying organizational infrastructure and the
associated dynamics (Stark 1996; Grabher and
Stark 1997), filling this gap promises to enhance
our understanding of Hong Kong’s transforma-
tion. Moreover, pre-handover Hong Kong fre-
quently ranked as among the freest economies of
the world in terms of ease of starting a business
and lack of governmental interference. In short,
1As Hung and Kuo (2010) document, the origins of
the principle date to earlier phases of Chinese history.
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Hong Kong’s pre-handover economy allowed for
relatively unfettered, fast access to markets—a
state of affairs that showed in routinely high
numbers of business registrations. Therefore, an
important empirical question asks whether this
activity has abated, persisted, or amplified after
the handover; it also seems worthwhile to know if
the composition of new business has shifted. In
general, we suggest that any change in the orga-
nizational infrastructure of Hong Kong hints at
the possibility of subsequent long-term economic
and social changes lurking ahead.
Among major political transformations, the
Hong Kong handover was unusual in its prede-
termination and relative predictability. The nine-
teenth century treaties that granted control of
the territory to the British contained clauses that
ceded sovereignty back to the Chinese at certain
dates, which the Chinese insisted be honored.
As these dates approached, pressure mounted
to make the transition orderly, and in 1984 the
two countries signed the Sino-British agreement,
which set July 1, 1997, as the official handover
date. China and Britain engaged in plenty of po-
litical jostling over the terms of the handover in
the interim, and anxiety over the impending trans-
formation reached almost shrill levels at times,
despite the ratification of the Basic Law in 1990.
However, there seemed little uncertainty about
whether and when the transformation would ac-
tually occur—virtually no one doubted it would
happen. Yet plenty of uncertainty existed over
how the Chinese government would act and what
impact its actions would effect, and views about
these issues shifted over time. Raynor (1990)
summarized the magnitude of the situation as he
saw it contemporaneously:
The proposed transformation period—
nearly 12 years—is one of the longest
in the history of decolonization.2 It
is the first capitalist territory to be
handed over to communist rule, and,
again for the first time, a Third World
country—China—will be taking over
a highly developed state: Hong Kong.
There are no relevant precedents to
draw upon.
2He defines the transformation period rather narrowly
as the pre-handover period.
Importantly, the preannounced handover date
meant that effects of the transformation possi-
bly started exerting themselves long before the
actual transition, as various interests positioned
themselves for what they expected might happen.
In this regard, the Hong Kong handover po-
tentially contains interesting insight about how
political environments affect organizational pop-
ulations. Most political transformations of com-
parable scale were unexpected—or at least un-
predictable in their timing. As a result, analysts
usually associate periods of political transforma-
tion with uncertainty, and political transforma-
tion is often regarded anxiously as detrimental
to business. Uncertainty involves many factors,
including growth prospects, rules of trade, con-
tract law, labor rights, and the like. At the core
of such uncertainty for entrepreneurs is concern
about the stability of property rights broadly de-
fined and consequent worries about recovering
anticipated future returns on investment (Jones
1981; Delong and Schleifer 1993; Olson 2000;
Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). However, a dif-
ferent analytical view looks beyond any short-
term, transformation-induced turmoil and exam-
ines congruence between the new polity and the
new organizational actors that may emerge. It
focuses on the opportunities unleashed and reshuf-
fled by the changed political system (Stinchcombe
1965; Fier 1998). Depending on the institutions,
policies, interests, and actors that are reassem-
bled, reconfigured, or replaced in a transforma-
tion, we imagine that processes involving either
uncertainty or opportunity might dominate the
organizational landscape.
As a result, we first juxtapose certain histori-
cal facts of the Hong Kong transformation with
general theoretical ideas about uncertainty and
opportunity. This exercise allows us to fashion fal-
sifiable arguments about how the handover may
have affected business formation—as indicated
by the number of new business registrations—
in Hong Kong. The arguments we develop draw
from received theory and prior empirical enquiries
(Stinchcombe 1965; Fier andWoywode 1994; Spen-
ner et al., 1998; Dobrev 1999; Dobrev 2000; Do-
brev 2001; Ingram and Simons 2000; Simons and
Ingram 2003; Windzio 2003). Accordingly, the
research strategy is neither entirely deductive
nor fully designed around theory testing per se.
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Rather, the approach we use is perhaps more
akin to retroduction, the inductive inference of
hypotheses or propositions from data. This ap-
proach involves making empirical generalizations
using information from the data themselves. Ac-
cording to Simon (1968), “in the history of science,
the retroduction of generalization and explana-
tions for data has been one of the central and
crucial processes.”
Nonetheless, the arguments we advance do ex-
tend theory about political transformation (Stinch-
combe 1965; Fier and Woywode 1994; Spenner et
al. 1998; Dobrev 1999; 2000; 2001; Ingram and
Simons 2000; Simons and Ingram, 2003; Windzio
2003) in three novel ways. First, we address
likely entrepreneurial activity in the build-up to
the transformation as well as that occurring sub-
sequently, whereas previous research concentrates
on the aftermath. Second, we distinguish between
anticipated effects on the temporal variance in
business registration as well as on the more con-
ventional mean level of registrations. Third, we
consider the mobility of organizational assets in
the transformation period and its aftermath, an
understudied mechanism.
A primary goal of our efforts here is empirical—
discovering and documenting exactly what hap-
pened in Hong Kong in the period of the handover.
In the empirical analysis, we aim to address the
gap in understanding exactly what happened to
entrepreneurial business activity in Hong Kong
before, during, and after the handover. Using
official monthly business registration data, we
analyze the rates of new business registration
in Hong Kong from 1975 to 2013. We use gen-
eralized autoregressive conditional heterogeneity
(GARCH) time-series models to assess the impact
of the handover on business formation among
both local and non-local companies. We specify
models that allow us to estimate the effects of
the build-up to the transformation as well as its
after-effects. We also specify models that allow
for detection in changes in variability over time
in business registrations in response to the han-
dover. These specifications can be taken as tests
of the theoretical arguments developed earlier. In
the models estimated for these tests, we include
controls for the general state of Hong Kong’s
economy and population as well as other factors
relevant to new business creation. To provide a
plausible counterfactual scenario, we conduct a
similar analysis of business registrations in Sin-
gapore over the same period.
Hong Kong’s Political
Transformation
Originally part of China, Hong Kong Island was
ceded to the United Kingdom in 1842 with the
signing of the Treaty of Nanking. The treaty
ended the First Opium War and made the island
a perpetual possession of Britain for use as a port.
The Convention of Peking, signed in 1860, ended
the Second Opium War and ceded in perpetuity
to the British the land forming the peninsula im-
mediately across from Hong Kong Island, known
as Kowloon. In 1898, the so-called Second Con-
vention of Peking was signed, granting Britain
a 99-year lease on the surrounding land, known
as the New Territories. Together, these three
parcels, which Britain ruled from 1898, consti-
tuted the political territory the world recognized
as Hong Kong through most of the twentieth
century.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the pending
expiration of the New Territories’ 99-year lease
prompted negotiations over the future of Hong
Kong. The discussions involved the fate of all of
Hong Kong’s territory because first, the Chinese
insisted on it, arguing that the perpetual treaties
were invalid; and second, it was impossible to
sustain so many inhabitants on the island and
Kowloon without access to the natural resources
(especially water) in the New Territories. The
uncertain future rattled the Hong Kong econ-
omy. The British eventually acknowledged the
inevitable and signed the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration in late 1984; this agreement gave up their
sovereign rights to all of Hong Kong when the
lease expired on June 30, 1997. The Joint Decla-
ration also pledged that China would allow Hong
Kong to retain its social and economic system
while retaining a high degree of autonomy, even
if ultimate sovereign authority did rest with the
People’s Republic of China.
Following the Joint Declaration, China and
Britain worked together with local officials to
design and manage a process to facilitate the
handover. This process generated the Basic Law
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
which resolved many legal governance issues con-
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cerning defense, rights, currency, and the like.
The Basic Law was first published in draft form
in April 1988, and then again in February 1989;
public commentary was invited. The final ver-
sion of the Basic Law was promulgated by the
National People’s Congress of the PRC in April
1990. It took effect at the time of the handover.
The longer than twelve-year interim from the
Joint Declaration to the handover proved to be an
emotional roller coaster ride for the Hong Kong
population. On one hand, much of the worst
uncertainty had apparently been resolved, and
the transformation became potentially calculable.
On the other hand, it became obvious to most ob-
servers that successful implementation depended
almost entirely on the credibility, goodwill, and
capability of the Chinese government. As the sole
sovereign power in place after the handover, the
PRC had the political authority to do just about
anything it wanted with Hong Kong, regardless
of any agreements or public promises. For ex-
ample, Vickers (2001) quotes the press secretary
of Governor Patten (the last British Governor
of Hong Kong) as saying in private at the time,
“It has become very clear that China is going to
constrain it, that it never intended to give Hong
Kong a high degree of autonomy.” Nevertheless,
many residents and observers became optimistic
about the future despite the threat of economic
and diplomatic losses if China backpedaled on the
agreements. Many also regarded reunification as
resolving a long-standing political problem and
anticipated that Hong Kong would serve as a
major conduit for economic activity into and out
of China.
Against this backdrop, the British and Chi-
nese governments continued to squabble from
time to time, often because Britain rushed to
implement unprecedented democratic reforms in
Hong Kong in hopes of forcing the Chinese to
make them permanent. Reflecting continued anx-
iety about the issue, emigration from Hong Kong
picked up dramatically at times, reaching a peak
in 1992 (Salaff, Shik, and Greve 2008). Dur-
ing this period, several highly visible businesses
diverted assets away from Hong Kong, raising
further alarms. Still, by early 1997 public polls
showed that more than 60 percent of the Hong
Kong population expressed optimism about the
future of Hong Kong’s economic performance (De-
Golyer 1997).
The handover itself went seamlessly. Despite
much fanfare and widespread invocation of sym-
bols, the glaring spotlight of the international
press failed to uncover any scandalous incidents
or any foul-ups of true significance. The PRC
rapidly implemented the Basic Law and appointed
a Chief Executive, as well as organizing a leg-
islative council that used mechanisms different
from those the British had tried to leave in place.
Meanwhile, Governor Patten and Prince Charles
sailed off peacefully on July 1, 1997, on the HMY
Brittania after relinquishing the government.
The ensuing period may long be the subject
of debate. With the Asian financial crisis of 1997,
Hong Kong’s real estate bubble burst and the
economy went into recession. The Hong Kong
government responded with a stimulus package
that apparently ignited recovery. Meanwhile, ten-
sions about who held ultimate legal authority
persisted, especially when Hong Kong’s Court of
Final Appeal was overruled by Beijing in 1999.
Later, the SARS epidemic ravaged the economy
in the winter and spring of 2003. The next year,
mass protests following an attempted promulga-
tion of an anti-subversion law raised concerns in
Beijing.
Analyses of the impact of political transforma-
tion on Hong Kong are inherently controversial
because of the difficulty in comparing its history
and development to those of other places (Martin
2007). No other place was truly comparable to
Hong Kong before the handover, and few places
have experienced social and economic forces simi-
lar to those non-political ones that have impinged
on Hong Kong since the handover. (Singapore
may be the closest in terms of economic position.)
While the current status of Hong Kong can be
assessed and compared to its pre-handover status,
the attribution of causality depends on the coun-
terfactuals assumed and involves disentangling
many factors. We attempt to take these issues
into account in the analyses below.
Theoretical Considerations Re-
garding Political Transformation
To develop arguments about new business for-
mation in Hong Kong during the handover pe-
riod, we start with two basic theoretical themes
regarding political transformation—uncertainty
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and opportunity. We briefly discuss each in turn
and then attempt to reconcile them with and in-
tegrate them into the Hong Kong case, where we
develop specific propositions about how political
transformation likely affected business foundings.
Entrepreneurial Uncertainty in
Political Transformation
Political transformation, as we use the term here,
implies broad systemic change in an institutional-
ized sovereign polity. Most political transforma-
tions entail a realignment between social group-
ings and societal resources (Skocpol 1979). From
this point of view, a political transformation
disrupts the social order; it creates—at least
temporarily—some degree of uncertainty (Stinch-
combe 1965). A political transformation also gen-
erates uncertainty because the role of the (new)
government and the impact of its regulations are
usually less predictable, thus obscuring the proba-
bilities of particular events and outcomes (Knight
1921).
Politically induced uncertainty worries ex-
ecutives, entrepreneurs, and external investors;
it causes many of them to act more conserva-
tively, or leads them to consider alternative in-
vestment and career options. For the managers of
firms, strategic adaptation to a changing political
environment presents great challenges because
the transformation is often not calculable and
its outcomes are unclear (Dobrev 1999; 2001).
Similar concerns rattle potential entrepreneurs—
uncertainty scares off many of them and their
investors and lowers the predictability of the pro-
ceses of both initiating organizing activity and
moving from there to the actual start of business
operations (Kuilman and Li 2006).
The twentieth century witnessed many major
political transformations, including the demise
of empires (in China, Germany, Russia, Turkey,
and Austro-Hungary); the rise of state socialism
(in Russia, China, and scores of underdeveloped
countries); the emergence of authoritarian states
(in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America);
the resurgence of theocratic states (in Iran and
other Islamic states); the waxing and waning of
democracy (in Central and South America); and
the collapse of dominant extranational regimes (in
the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc). Most of
these transformations were generally unexpected
or at least unpredictable in their timing until they
were imminent. And, while they were occurring,
observers and analysts often tended to view the
unfolding of events as less than fully predictable.
So, political transformation generates uncer-
tainty, and for that reason anticipated or loom-
ing political transformation is often regarded
anxiously as detrimental to business, including
new entrepreneurial activity. Uncertainty encom-
passes numerous factors, including labor rights,
contract law, prospects for organizational and eco-
nomic growth, and rules of trade. At the center of
such immediate uncertainty is concern about the
stability of property rights and consequent wor-
ries about recovering anticipated future returns
on contemporaneous investment.3 As Acemoglu
and Johnson (2005) define them, property rights
institutions are “the rules and regulations protect-
ing citizens against the power of the government
and elites.” The concern is not just about pos-
sible government expropriation but also about
possible government enforcement of an economic
context where the rules might tilt towards certain
firms and actors close to those holding political
power.
The period of uncertainty associated with a
political transformation typically extends far be-
yond the actual political or legal events involved.
When a new political system is established, credi-
bility may be questionable. A first question often
asked is whether the rules that were expected
to be put in place were indeed those enacted.
Then, even though certain specific rules might be
installed initially, observers know that their imple-
mentation and enforcement matter enormously.4
It takes time to observe, evaluate, and under-
stand enforcement behavior; experience with a
polity counts for a lot. In addition, the govern-
ment itself needs to work out details of operation.
These will usually be implemented by technocrats,
and so the details may or may not prove to be
fully consistent with the prior public claims of
political leaders. Finally, as powerful interests
challenge rules, the nerve and fortitude of the
3Contracting rights among exchange partners may also
seem an important issue. However, empirical study sug-
gests it to be of far less impact, as contracting partners
can usually find their own solutions in the midst of weak
state enforcement (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005).
4Consider, for instance, ex-IBM CEO Sam Palmisano:
“Underpinning the intellectual property regime must be
consistent enforcement. . . ” (2014: 83).
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political elites and officials running the regime
will be assessed to determine likely stability.
Entrepreneurial Opportunity in
Political Transformations
A different view of political transformation fo-
cuses on the potential new opportunity that some-
times emerges as established markets are dis-
rupted, if not undermined, and new markets arise
(see Stinchcombe 1965). That is, political trans-
formation induces change in socioeconomic align-
ments, altering ties between social groupings and
resources by introducing new rules, whether for-
mal or informal. So, at least for some actors, the
advent of a new political system brings with it po-
tential rewards, perhaps new or perhaps wrested
from others, perhaps intended or perhaps hap-
penstance. The possibility of capturing these
potential rewards in a fast-changing environment
should attract and encourage some entrepreneurs.
As North (1992) observes, “institutions are
not necessarily or even usually created to be so-
cially efficient; rather they, or at least the formal
rules, are created to serve the interests of those
with the bargaining power to create new rules.”
Thus the entrepreneurs who are attracted to an
environment of political transformation may not
necessarily be highly risk-seeking—they may just
view the emerging new order as better suited to
their interests. For instance, Simons and Ingram
(2003) show that the kibbutz organizational form
prospered in the era before the State of Israel
was established; after the state developed, its
prominence and role were diminished. Ingram
and Simons (2000) also show that cooperative
forms of organization arose and thrived under
regimes with compatible (leftist) ideologies.
This alternative view builds on the assump-
tion that entrepreneurs seek new, emerging, and
unusual opportunities. Entrepreneurs attempt
to spot these opportunities and exploit them be-
fore other, established players can gain positional
advantage; entrepreneurs thrive by taking quick
advantage of new resources. Accordingly, some
entrepreneurs may anticipate and bet on the pos-
sibilities generated by a political transformation.
As Hannan and Freeman (1989) observe, “periods
of political crises and social revolution seem to
be peak times for building new forms of organiza-
tions.” Accordingly, much research focused on the
regeneration period after a major transformation
documents how emergent organizational forms
are legitimated and become prevalent (Fier and
Woywode 1994; Fier 1998; Dobrev 1999; 2000;
2001; Spenner et al. 1998; Windzio 2003).
Reconciling Uncertainty
and Opportunity
Uncertainty and opportunity reflect two oppo-
site sides of the transformation coin. The forces
in any transformation clearly generate both con-
ditions. Even the most orderly, well financed,
and most fully agreed-upon transformation in-
duces some uncertainty simply because large-
scale change cannot be completely controlled and
shielded from unexpected consequences. Con-
versely, even the most severe crackdown by a
repressive government unsympathetic to private
enterprise will share market access with some
insiders and cronies who see the development as
opportunity. The challenging question in analyz-
ing any specific historical transformation concerns
how strong the forces driving the two conditions
are relative to each other: Which condition will
dominate, uncertainty or opportunity?
To address this question, we attempt to build
an analytical framework that we can use for
Hong Kong. Obviously, analysis of the polity
is central. As North (1992) observes, “it is the
polity that defines and enforces property rights.”
But as Weingast (1995) explains, this creates a
dilemma because “a government strong enough to
protect property rights and enforce contracts is
also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its
citizens.” Overcoming the dilemma requires that
the political system embrace an ideology that tol-
erates, if not supports, private property, and that
its design include credible limits on state power.
Thus in analyzing a transformation, a compara-
tive analysis of the polities in place before and
after the shift is key. The analysis should include
the polities’ ideologies, interests, capabilities, re-
sources, experiences, and mechanisms that limit
its power.
Given the clear and strong directional change
in the polities involved in the transformations of
the Eastern Bloc countries in the early 1990s, it
was easy to determine that the opportunity condi-
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tion would dominate. Avowedly liberal party sys-
tems with capitalistic ideologies replaced single-
party systems that embraced state socialism. Fur-
ther, the previously established business infras-
tructure was radically underdeveloped relative
to the sizes and educational levels of the human
populations. Conversely, as in Cuba in the 1950s,
when autocratic socialist polities take over and
start expropriating private property from the
many and sanctioning enterprise only for a few,
it is clear that uncertainty dominates.
But what about other, less radical (or more
ambiguous) cases of transformation? How should
we analyze which condition will dominate? What
analytical tools might be applied? In our view,
scrutiny of the polities remains relevant, but we
also think that calculation of the relative de-
mographic sizes of the interest groups likely to
be affected—the potential winners and losers—
becomes important. In other words, we suggest
examining the relative sizes of the interest groups
likely associated with the new and old polities to
assess how many will be affected by each condi-
tion.
How to do this? We propose tackling the is-
sue in two steps. First, identify and calibrate the
rough demographic sizes of the major relevant
socioeconomic groups positioned to be affected
economically (whether adversely or beneficially)
by the transformation. Second, assess how the
forces generating uncertainty versus opportunity
might impinge upon each group, especially in fac-
tors that matter to the formation of new business.
The conclusion of this analysis may very well
point to which group(s) and condition will dom-
inate, thus allowing a general prediction about
business formation.
This approach recognizes that anticipating
either uncertainty or opportunity puts the focus
on different aspects of the transformation that,
although tightly interrelated in many real events,
are analytically separable. For example, a change
in government that keeps property rights constant
but ousts a business interest group close to the
old government in favor of a new group can be
seen as creating opportunity for the new group.
Supposing the new group is significantly larger
demographically than the old group, then, on a
broad scale, the transformation generated more
opportunity than uncertainty. Conversely, if the
change in government did not appreciably change
the structure of the favored business elite but
did apparently undermine certain property rights
upon which they relied, then the transformation
likely created uncertainty about investment re-
turn that would hamper business founding and
other activity. So, predicting a transformation’s
impact on business entails: (1) identifying the
specific demographic groups or classes with re-
alistic market access who rely on property and
estimating their relative sizes; and (2) analyzing
how the expected changes in property rights as-
sociated with the change in polities might affect
each group.
Such calculations will likely never be easy or
precise and may be impossible in cases where the
situation is too complex or subtle or not enough
relevant information is available. However, if
the political system undergoes radical transfor-
mation, the force of the processes involved may
be so great and its direction so clear that one
can confidently estimate what will occur in terms
of of both uncertainty and opportunity. For ex-
ample, when the Iron Curtain collapsed in 1990,
plenty of uncertainty was created. However, at
the same time the new polities forming in Rus-
sia, the former Soviet states, and most of the
Eastern Bloc signaled that markets and prop-
erty rights would be strengthened (from very low
levels), and the demographic base that might
realistically take advantage of them (potential en-
trepreneurs) looked greatly enlarged. The antici-
pated effect of unleashing property rights to such
latent groups was so huge that it swamped con-
cerns about an imperfect state (and the demise
of the minuscule existing base of entrenched so-
cialist “entrepreneurs”). The result was a massive
wave of entrepreneurship and new business for-
mation in all these countries (Fier and Woywode
1994; Spenner et al. 1998; Dobrev 1999).
Uncertainty and Opportunity
in Hong Kong’s Handover
The situation surrounding the Hong Kong han-
dover was less clear, and obviously it was very
different from the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.
Britain’s Hong Kong polity supported a long-
standing, relatively unfettered, capitalistic sys-
tem supported by an established legal system
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that was regarded by many as open and unen-
cumbered. It both protected private property
and allowed access by many. This system was
being replaced by an avidly pro-capitalist polity
that did not apparently face credible limits to
its power, lacked full transparency to outsiders,
carried a legacy of state socialism, and remained
communist at least in name. The new system
would not necessarily encroach on property rights
or limit market access, and its leaders even made
repeated public assurances to the contrary, as
in the Basic Law. However, for some residents
and observers, the lack of real limits on state
power and the earlier history of the PRC’s op-
position to free market capitalism meant that
caution was wise, at least initially. This reticence
was reflected in public opinion polls right before
the handover, in which the Chinese government
received a low score from Hong Kongers on issues
of trust; the polls also showed that more than
two thirds of the populace held negative, ambiva-
lent, or neutral feelings about the transformation
(Sing 2001).
The demographic groups meaningfully involved
in potential new business formation in this situ-
ation can be grouped into three categories: (1)
those aligned with the British regime; (2) those
aligned with the PRC regime and their local del-
egation; and (3) the Hong Kong locals. Quite
obviously, allies of the British regime worried
about their prospects in the transformed Hong
Kong. This group was most closely aligned with
the existing power and economic context. Any
threat to property rights protection, or to the
legal system and socioeconomic context that sup-
ported such protection (Acemoglu and Johnson
2005) would potentially undermine returns to
their investments. This group also worried about
whether the new government might provide unfair
access and protection to business interests asso-
ciated with the regime in Beijing. Accordingly,
new business formation among this entrenched
group likely declined, analagous to trends seen in
other political transitions.
Political transformation in Hong Kong likely
did unleash some new opportunities for entrepre-
neurs who wished to leverage the growing busi-
ness connection between Hong Kong and main-
land China. Under the colonial system, the
monopoly-like power of business in certain scale-
driven sectors was tolerated, if not encouraged,
by some. Some entrepreneurs may have viewed
the new Hong Kong as more accessible than be-
fore because some monopolies were potentially
threatened; yet other entrepreneurs, aligned with
the PRC and its reigning Party, may have gained
easier access or have entered believing that they
might possess some advantage. In both cases we
would expect that, at least for the favored types of
entrepreneurs and organizations, political change
would have induced rather than impeded busi-
ness activity, including startups. By 2001, four
years after the handover, mainland China was
the largest investor in the territory, with a to-
tal of US$122.8 billion, accounting for perhaps
30 percent of new investment (Holliday, Ngok,
and Yep 2004). However, we suspect that the
relative demographic size of the base presented
with these favored opportunities was not large,
at least initially, and that it took them time to
get fully engaged.
As for the local Hong Kong business commu-
nity, including latent entrepreneurs, we suspect
that the average individual anticipating invest-
ment in new business activity in a local Hong
Kong company around the handover was appre-
hensive. Presumably most of the entrepreneurs
and investors behind such potential ventures held
reservations about the historically socialist PRC
government. Even if the government’s pro-capital-
ist pledges and recent behavior could be taken as
evidence of permanent change, Weingast’s (1995)
fundamental dilemma remained operative: there
appeared to be few, if any, credible checks on the
power of the polity under the new system. As a
correspondent of the magazine Asia Today put
it in 1996:
Only months remain until Hong Kong
is returned to China. Not surprisingly,
this remains the major source of con-
cern for those living and doing busi-
ness in Hong Kong. “How can we be
sure,” people ask, “that the features
which have made Hong Kong the vi-
tal and successful business centre it
is today will continue after the han-
dover? How can we be sure that Hong
Kong’s ’new masters’ will understand
that, above all, Hong Kong thrives on
the confidence that both its own pop-
ulation and the outside world have in
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its ability to react quickly and appro-
priately to changing business fortunes;
that key elements such as confidence
in the rule of law are essential to the
smooth running of this dynamic and
hugely successful commercial centre?
(Bergman 1996).
Ironically, the pro-capitalist stance of the
PRC central government and its specific interac-
tions with business elites in Hong Kong during
the build-up to the handover might even have
undermined people’s faith in property rights and
prompted them to reconsider business investment.
As Hung (2010) observed, “keen to maintain Hong
Kong’s economic vitality throughout the transi-
tion period, Beijing cultivated the goodwill of
the business elite, and increasingly prioritized
their views.” This cultivation can be seen in the
composition of the Drafting Committee for the
Basic Law; among 23 members from Hong Kong,
magnates such as Li Ka-Shing and Pao Yue-Kong
dominated. The articles of the Basic Law critical
to social welfare, taxation, labor protection, col-
lective bargaining, and political reform practically
all conformed to the preferences of business elites.
Through coalition with Beijing, a handful of Hong
Kong’s top capitalists minimized uncertainty, for-
tified existing advantage, and positioned them-
selves to take future potential opportunities when
the political transformation actually occurred.5
However, worries about damage to the economic
system were not unwarranted, as public anxiety
was indeed raised by several controversial cases of
apparently privileged resource access under the
government-initiated economic recovery program
in 2000 (Hung 2010).
Business Formation Rates
In sum, according to this analysis, many resi-
dents of Hong Kong—both British-affiliated and
locals—would figure they potentially had much
to lose by the change in regime; this sentiment
likely strengthened the populace’s increasingly
visible democracy movement. In addition, local
entrepreneurs had limited ability to exit the ter-
ritory with capital and other assets intact. All of
5The steady rise in inequality in Hong Kong from the
early 1980s to the present may reflect this process.
these factors likely heightened uncertainty and
thwarted initiation of new local businesses in the
period leading up to the handover as well as the
period following the handover. This heightened
uncertainty is likely to have overshadowed the
business opportunities that arose from the han-
dover. In the period before the handover there
was the plausible prospect of diminished prop-
erty rights; the period after the handover was
inherently ambiguous given the time needed for
a new political system to establish a record of
credibility (and uncertainty about whether this
new system would in fact do so). Moreover, the
number of potential new entrepreneurs associ-
ated with the PRC was likely not large, at least
initially, and the movement of personnel and re-
sources required to make up for the departures
of British allies and the diminished optimism of
locals would require significant time and support.
Not surprisingly, empirical evidence shows that
the market for initial public offerings deteriorated
with the handover because of the dominance of
uncertainty (Carey and Steen 2006). Thus we
argue:
Proposition 1. Political transformation in Hong
Kong lowered the founding rate of businesses from
that to be expected from historical patterns of eco-
nomic activity and population growth.
Dynamics of Political
Transformation
Political transformation induces a shock to an
economy—the rules of the game change suddenly
When uncertainty prevails, some nervous entre-
preneurs and investors stay away, fraught with
anxiety about what might happen under the new
polity. When opportunity prevails, entrepreneurs
may fall over themselves rushing in, and the noise
of the stampede may alert others and generate
an even larger rush in a later phase.
As the new polity develops, it accumulates a
record. The record consists of the actual decisions
and experiences of various actors in the new po-
litical system, including political leaders, govern-
ment officials, entrepreneurs, investors, property
owners and employees. The record includes be-
haviors and statements that will be interpreted as
revealing values, preferences, and policy positions;
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consistency in the record indicates a plausible
future under the new system. Assuming polit-
ical stability, a consistent record suggests the
treatment that new actors of the same kind will
likely receive—it reduces uncertainty and makes
opportunities more transparent and calculable.
Reducing uncertainty should increase the busi-
ness formation rate, allowing it to rise gradually
to a steady level. Making opportunities trans-
parent and calculable should serve to temper any
initial irrational exuberance the transformation
may have ignited.
In any political takeover, agreements and
other promises can only go so far in reducing
uncertainty or making plain the extent of new
opportunities. Hong Kong was no exception. De-
spite the Joint Declaration and subsequent agree-
ments, it was widely understood that nothing
was necessarily binding on the incoming sovereign
state. Once the political transfer occurred, many
different things could happen: sovereignty means
supreme authority over a territory, and China
would have sovereignty over Hong Kong.
As a result, uncertainty persisted in the im-
mediate post-handover period. A public mood
of anxiety and uneasiness prevailed, according to
Liu (1999), who reported much grumbling among
the population. Despite the Basic Law, it was
impossible to know from a business perspective
on July 1, 1997, what the exact firm-level con-
sequences of the new political system would be.
Legal analysts such as Rubenstein (1997) con-
tributed to the uncertainty by noting structural
challenges: “real private-law protection for en-
trants will require a fundamental rethinking of
institutional arrangements which make up party-
state rule.”
With the passage of time, the new system
and regime were seen, experienced, and evalu-
ated; new rules and institutions were also put
into place, and these gave some clues to the fu-
ture. Although certain events and decisions, usu-
ally around the freedom of speech, occasionally
garnered great media attention, most sober and
dispassionate analyses recognized that the PRC
and the new Hong Kong government had fulfilled
their promises, especially as concerned private
property and associated rights. Lanfang (1999)
lauded the way in which a deal for arbitral awards
was worked out and then guided subsequent judi-
cial rulings. Sing (2001) declared that the Hong
Kong government had achieved legitimacy in the
eyes of the public. Boniface and Alon (2010)
judged that voice and accountability had actually
increased since the handover, leading them to
announce that, “China has largely honored the
principle of one country, two systems after ten
years.”
The increased acceptance of, and comfort
with, the new regime can be seen in emigra-
tion patterns. An official with the Consulate
General of Canada—one of the more popular
destinations for those leaving Hong Kong—said
that although about 150,000 Hong Kongers had
moved to Canada in the 15 years prior to the han-
dover, patterns changed after the handover. “In
the run-up to the handover, it was phenomenal,
but now it’s down to what we would consider a
normal level” (South China Morning Post 1998).
Identification with the new regime also became
more common. A series of six surveys by Ma and
Fung (2007) shows that Hong Kongers increas-
ingly came to see themselves as similar to main-
land Chinese, a development likely reinforced by
acceptance of language changes (Ling 2012).
At the same time, new business opportuni-
ties started to emerge after the handover. Ob-
servers and analysts (Martin 2007) have noted,
for instance, that Hong Kong’s economy recov-
ered strongly from the problems of the early post-
handover period. After experiencing sluggishness
during the Asian financial crisis and the SARS epi-
demic, the economy picked up considerably. Real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at high
annual rates of seven to eight percent during the
middle of the current decade before slowing down.
Per capita GDP remains at levels similar to many
developed countries, and the legitimacy of the
government is often attributed to this continued
prosperity despite rising inequality (Hung 2010).
In addition, the economic relationship between
Hong Kong and China deepened at a fast pace;
bilateral trade more than doubled in the decade
following the handover. Although this might now
seem an inevitable development, it was not con-
sidered so at the time of the handover, in large
part because shipments of goods and materials
to and from China were treated the same as from
any foreign country. In most observers’ assess-
ments, the deepened interaction emerged from:
(1) the economic slowdown of Hong Kong’s other
Southeast Asian national trading partners; (2)
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the institution of a free trade agreement between
Hong Kong and China; and (3) the continued
expansion of the tightly linked Pearl River Delta
economic region (Holliday et al. 2004).
Thus we expect that entrepreneurial behavior
rebounded as the record of the new polity length-
ened. Uncertainty about the handover may have
hampered business formation initially, but once
the political consequences of the transformation
could be directly observed, uncertainty subsided
(because the post-handover experience showed
that property rights were apparently secure) and
new opportunities emerged. These developments
took many years, and, as Dittmer (2011) recently
noted, Hong Kong’s integration is “still a work in
progress.” Thus we expect that
Proposition 2. The effect of Hong Kong’s trans-
formation on the business founding rate attenu-
ated with time following the transformation.
Dynamic Variability in
Public Sentiment
Despite its formal commitment to socialism, the
incumbent PRC polity in the early 1990s ac-
tively supported market-based enterprise and
had been moving in this direction for several
decades. China is sometimes referred to as a “so-
cialist market economy,” reflecting its mixture of
central command structures and market forces.
State-owned enterprises dominate the economy
and operate exclusively in industries regarded as
strategic to national security, and for many years,
private foreign firms were allowed to do business
in China only through joint ventures with Chi-
nese partners. However, in the last decade legal
reforms have recognized and established private
property rights, including those of private firms.
The PRC’s promises about capitalism in the
Basic Law naturally produced a certain level of
enthusiasm from businesses that sought to lo-
cate in Hong Kong, whether as an entry point to
China, for the local market, or for export reasons.
The possible returns may have looked large to po-
tential entrepreneurs, and if they could tolerate
the risk, the calculation would have encouraged
them to invest. For many, though, the risk may
have seemed too high. A commonly perceived
problem was that any pledge made by the PRC
polity lacked full credibility: no real checks ex-
isted against its unconstrained authority and its
overtly socialist counter-pledges. Whenever due
diligence was conducted, however informal, this
reality must have entered the calculation, espe-
cially among outsiders.
In essence, the pro-capitalist yet formally com-
munist authoritarian polity represented an inher-
ent contradiction to many observers and partic-
ipants. This contradiction produced dramatic
fluctuations in prevailing public opinion about
the risks to freedom and property entailed in the
handover. As a 1996 piece in the local newspaper
described the situation:
A total of 50,000 people will have left
Hong Kong by the end of 1996, com-
pared with 46,000 last year, indicat-
ing continuing nervousness especially
among the middle class after Hong
Kong reverts to Chinese rule. But
the figures, though considered high
overall, also show that some degree
of calm has set in. Although the situ-
ation remains volatile, the mood has
eased up compared to two or three
years ago, analysts say (Sharma 1996).
At times, individuals and businesses expressed
fear, made plans to leave, or even actually em-
igrated. For instance, Jardine Matheson, one
of the oldest British-owned companies in Hong
Kong, moved its headquarters to Bermuda in
1984 and its stock listing to Singapore in 1994,
in anticipation of the handover. Similarly, HSBC
transferred assets to London under a new holding
structure in 1991. At other times, the risks were
glossed over and buried under waves of optimism
about the resolution of Hong Kong’s status and
the gateway it would provide to China. In both
instances, the actions of a few high-status actors
were often widely interpreted as meaningful and
produced waves of imitative behavior. The situa-
tion was exacerbated by the truly unpredictable
and unknowable nature of the risk involved; al-
most any scenario seemed potentially plausible.
Moreover, the high population density of Hong
Kong fuelled rumors, as did the connections that
many residents and visitors supposedly held with
key mainland officials. The vibrant Hong Kong
media also played a role in highlighting the many
issues involved in the handover and framing them
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in many different ways, across outlets and over
time (Pan et al. 1999; Qing 2000; Fung 2007;
Flahery 2011; Oksanen 2011).
This mixed flow of optimism and pessimism
likely affected business formation. In our assess-
ment, such shifting sentiments probably colored
even professional calculations about risk and gen-
erated volatility. If so, then it would have also
produced greater-than-usual variance over time
in startup activity, even if the average level of
activity trended downward because of anxiety
over property rights (Proposition 1). Again, we
think that the effect might transcend the period
of the actual handover itself. Anxiety obviously
operated before the transformation, and the post-
handover period was filled with equally many
questions about rights amid possible regulatory
changes. Would the PRC overrule the high court
in Hong Kong? What would immigration policy
be? Would the press be allowed to continue to
operate freely? Would civil unrest occur? When
would democratic elections be held for all political
positions? As events unfolded after the transition,
some encouraged widespread optimism while oth-
ers spread pessimism. Thus we argue:
Proposition 3. Hong Kong’s political transfor-
mation generated greater variance (volatility) in
the founding rate of businesses, as public senti-
ment waxed and waned.
Asset Mobility
Among those firms that do enter a system under
political transformation, the potentially unsta-
ble rules of the game likely make entrepreneurs
and investors cautious and protective of their as-
sets, to the extent possible. Organizations faced
with substantial uncertainty are likely to position
their assets to be mobile, at least until the uncer-
tainty subsides. This may be true even for those
who entered because they perceived favorable op-
portunities for their interests, as the structures
supporting the opportunities may not be stable.
As the New York Times noted in 1987,
. . . private capital is poised for flight.
Many business people say they are
planning to leave for other countries;
what is holding them now, some say,
are aged parents whom they are un-
willing to leave. A Chinese builder,
whose home is in Singapore but who
has projects going in Hong Kong, said
everyone he knows is holding as much
money as possible in foreign currency,
ready to leave Hong Kong quickly
(Silk 1987: 2).
Williamson (1996: 331) describes the scenario
in more general theoretical terms:
Investors who realize that they are
disadvantaged in relation to other,
more favored members of the soci-
ety can and will adapt in a variety
of ways. Thus more durable assets
will be replaced by less durable; non-
mobile assets will be replaced by more
mobile; conspicuous assets will give
way to those that can be sequestered;
and assets may flee by relocating in
more secure jurisdictions. More gen-
erally, non-redeployable investments
that would be made if expectations
were secure will give way to redeploy-
able assets and capital flight and as-
set concealment. Productivity will be
lost as a result.
To gain insight into the dynamics of this pos-
sible redeployment process, we propose consider-
ation of what might be called the “organizational
asset mobility ratio.” We define this as the pro-
portion of firms with more mobile organizational
structures (that is, those that can be moved with-
out undue effort) within the population of all
firms. In Hong Kong, such differences in organi-
zational mobility are reflected roughly by whether
firms are registered as non-local firms (that is,
branches of foreign firms) or local firms, includ-
ing subsidiaries. Thus the organizational asset
mobility ratio in Hong Kong is the proportion
of non-local firms in the pool of all local and
non-local firms.
The type of registration is a choice that the
owners of the firm make. Non-local firms (for-
eign branches) are incorporated elsewhere; local
firms and subsidiaries are incorporated in Hong
Kong and are considered independent entities.6
According to Lawrence (2005: 1),
6For non-local companies, the country of origin is also
identified. Following the handover, the data show a down-
ward trend in the number of companies registered from
the United Kingdom, which conforms to the opportunity
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The business activities available to
a company in Hong Kong are gener-
ally not dependent upon whether the
company is locally incorporated, and
there is generally little practical dif-
ference between operating a branch
and a subsidiary company in respect
of profit computation. The rate of tax
levied on profits is the same for local
and foreign companies, and dividends
are not subject to separate taxation
in Hong Kong.
Rather, the differences between local and non-
local registration lie in the ease of initial setup
and of liquidation, and in foreign tax advantages,
local audit requirements, the assets that can be
leveraged for credit, and the extent of legal li-
ability. Non-local firms are easier to liquidate,
can draw on the credit of the parent, might re-
ceive tax advantages from their home country
(especially as concerns losses), can easily transfer
profits to the parent (out of the country), and do
not require separate audits on their Hong Kong
operations.
Non-locals face potentially greater liability in
that the parent firm can be sued in Hong Kong.
Liability, however, is a complex issue that can be
thwarted in many ways. For instance, should the
firm decide to abandon the Hong Kong market,
the issue might prove moot. Further, consider
Cerutti, Dell’ Ariccia, and Martínez Pería’s (2007:
1671) analysis of international banks:
Branches are less common in coun-
tries with highly risky macroeconomic
environments, where parent banks
seem to prefer the “hard” shield of lim-
ited liability provided by subsidiaries
to the “soft” protection of ring-fencing
provisions. However, faced with risks
thesis—these could be regarded as the displaced or disfa-
vored firms. Another interesting trend is the pronounced
uptick of new companies from the Cayman Islands and
the British Virgin Islands after the transition. Why would
the individuals behind these companies view the change in
political systems as a potential opportunity? The answer
seems to be that many of them are actually mainland Chi-
nese companies that incorporated in these places and then
registered in Hong Kong to do business and obtain listings
(South China Morning Post 2009). However, the situation
behind every company is not readily knowable, and the
motivations behind such maneuvers are not discernible
from public records.
stemming from possible government
intervention and other major polit-
ical events, parent banks are more
likely to operate as branches. This is
not necessarily surprising given the
provisions that shield parent banks
from the liabilities of their foreign
branches in events such as wars, in-
surrections, or arbitrary actions by
foreign governments. Under those cir-
cumstances, banks are actually more
exposed as subsidiaries, which typi-
cally have higher capital and reserve
requirements and larger investments
in local fixed assets, relative to branch-
es.
So it would seem that the liability risk to a
parent facing a government takeover could be
minimized in the case of a non-local or foreign
branch, mainly because the takeover would not
carry legal standing in the parent’s home country
and legal system.
By contrast, local firms or subsidiaries are
easier to set up, and their liability risk is lim-
ited to their local shares, paid-in capital, and
local investments. But setting up a local firm
or subsidiary suggests a degree of commitment
to the local market, as well as some confidence
that new business opportunities lie ahead and
that investments in these opportunities can be
profitably made without being jeopardized by
political events and actions. These factors make
local firms (foreign subsidiaries) considerably less
mobile and, depending on the home country, pos-
sibly more transparent. In our view, a political
transformation that reduces the perception of
business opportunities and increases uncertainty
by threatening property rights should result in
a greater proportion of non-local firms—that is,
a higher organizational asset mobility ratio. We
posit:
Proposition 4. Hong Kong’s political transfor-
mation increased the average organizational asset
mobility ratio among newly founded businesses.
Dynamics of Asset Mobility
As with business formation, the organizational
asset mobility ratio should gradually adjust fol-
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lowing the shock of a political transformation,
provided stability ensues. Again, the actual ex-
perience under the new system seems crucial; it
gives entrepreneurs and investors a record of gov-
ernmental regulatory behavior to observe and
evaluate, which they use to assess the risks in-
volved.
In Hong Kong, the early signals of the period
around the Joint Declaration were interpreted
as ambiguous, but these were followed by fairly
consistent behavior indicating that the pledge to
capitalism and private property could be taken
as reliable. Business opportunities started to
emerge as the economy picked up and interaction
between mainland China and Hong Kong deep-
ened. As a result of both decreased uncertainty
and perceptions of new opportunities for aspiring
entrepreneurs and business owners, we expect
that the organizational asset mobility ratio will
eventually revert back to its pre-transformation
levels.
Proposition 5. The effect of Hong Kong’s trans-
formation on the organizational asset mobility
ratio among newly founded businesses rate atten-
uated with the time following the transformation.
Data
The data we analyze describe information on lo-
cal and non-local incorporations in Hong Kong
from January 1975 to March 2013. The main
source for this data is the Companies Registry in
Hong Kong (Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region, Various Years). Given that the Compa-
nies Ordinance legally requires registration of all
corporations in Hong Kong, the available data
is comprehensive and highly suitable for demo-
graphic analysis (Carroll and Hannan 2000). The
dataset records observations over a period of 459
months in which 1,860,653 corporations were reg-
istered.
For the dependent variable, we use the monthly
total number of corporations newly registered with
the Hong Kong Companies Registry to test Propo-
sitions 1-3. Figure 1 shows the temporal trajec-
tory of this variable over the period of the study.
Obviously, registrations have gone up dramat-
ically over the period, albeit in fits and starts
at times. Note that Figure 1 reflects the gross
count of registrations and does not necessarily
reflect net values after controlling for socioeco-
nomic factors and other time-varying covariates.
Thus inferences should be made from this figure
with caution.
We consider two major types of registrations.
Domestic entrepreneurs and business owners gen-
erally register as a local business. Foreign en-
trepreneurs and business owners can opt to regis-
ter as a non-local company or as a local business
in Hong Kong. The foreign branches that re-
sult from non-local registration are not legally
separable from their parent company. A local
company registered by a foreign business, how-
ever, is legally a distinct entity, even if the parent
owns all of the voting stock.
The number of local registrations far exceeds
the number of non-local registrations: 18,239 reg-
istrations of non-local corporations and 1,842,414
of local corporations took place within our obser-
vation window. Figure 2 plots the historical tra-
jectories of the two types (with numbers logged
for ease of comparison). This figure shows an
upward trajectory in registrations for both legal
forms.
In studying the organizational asset mobility
ratio, we rely on the normalized ratio of non-
local registrations (foreign branches) as a pro-
portion of all new firms in the territory. Since
this ratio is bounded between 0 and 1, we fol-
lowed Tukey (1977) and used this logit transfor-
mation to make it follow a normal distribution:
ln[Ratio/(1-Ratio)].
Our independent variables include a measure
of the total number of registrations of local and
non-local corporations in Hong Kong to capture
any potential impact of a competitive or legiti-
mating nature (Carroll and Hannan 2000). Den-
sity variables were lagged one month to address
reverse causation.7
In addition, we used two overlapping period
dummies. The Post-Joint Declaration period is
coded as one for all months after December 1984,
zero otherwise. The Post-handover dummy is
coded as one for all months after July 1997, zero
7In exploratory analyses, we also investigated the pos-
sibility of non-monotonic relationships between business
registrations and the total numbers of local and non-local
corporations, as hinted at by ecological theory (Carroll
and Hannan, 2000). The estimates proved not to be
statistically significant.
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Figure 1: New Business Registrations in Hong Kong by Month 1975-2013
otherwise. With overlapping period dummies, the
time period immediately preceding each dummy
serves as the reference category. Two separate
indicator variables were included to mark the cor-
responding events: one for December 1984, when
the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed and
one for July 1997 to indicate the immediate im-
pact of the handover itself. To study whether any
effects the handover had on business formation
abated or amplified with the growing number of
months since the handover, we added a “clock”
that is coded as zero prior to the handover, is
coded as one in July 1997, and then increments
by one each month up to a value of 188 in March
2013.
Finally, we controlled for a number of socioe-
conomic factors that could have affected business
registrations in Hong Kong. To account for gen-
eral levels of economic activity, we included the
Gross Domestic Product (in HK$ million at cur-
rent market prices) with a one month lag. Since
this variable was not available on a monthly basis
for the entire observation window, linear inter-
polation was used in case of quarterly or yearly
observations. Lending rates using the IMF Inter-
national Financial Statistics were included with
a one month lag. The Asian financial crisis af-
fected Hong Kong from October 1997 (when stock
markets crashed) to August 1998 (when they re-
bounded after substantial government spending).
We also controlled for the impact of the recent
global financial crisis, a period from December
2007 to December 2012. Finally, throughout our
research window, we observed a sizable surge of
new business registrations after each Chinese New
Year,8 mostly in March. We controlled for this
Chinese New Year effect by including a dummy
for March in our models.
To build a plausible counterfactual compari-
son case, we compiled similar data on Singapore.
Although different in many respects, Singapore re-
sembles Hong Kong in being a vibrant, advanced,
city-based economy in Asia, with a roughly com-
8In societies where Chinese culture is dominant, like
Hong Kong, Singapore, and mainland China, both busi-
ness activities and public services would slow down con-
siderably during the weeks immediately before and after
the Chinese New Year, and pick up rapidly again when
people resumed regular working schedules.
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Figure 2: Comparing Monthly (Log) Local and Non-local New Registrations 1975-2013
parable economy, human population, and geog-
raphy. Supplemental Appendix 1 lists major de-
mographic and economic indicators for the two
economies. Besides land size and population,
Hong Kong and Singapore are quite comparable
across these types of indicators in both magnitude
and their respective ranks in the world economy.
Regarding globalization, although Singapore de-
pends on foreign trade more strongly than does
Hong Kong, the latter remains a more attractive
destination for foreign direct investment.
To state the obvious, however, Singapore did
not experience a political transformation like
Hong Kong’s handover. Thus we estimate com-
parable models of business registrations in Sin-
gapore to see whether the patterns we observe
in Hong Kong might reflect a more general re-
gional pattern experienced in Singapore as well.
The data on Singapore come from the Depart-
ment of Statistics (Singapore Government, Vari-
ous Years), which collects comprehensive statisti-
cal time series on Singapore’s society and econ-
omy, including national accounts, investments,
business expectations, trade, manufacturing, and
demography. Because several variables of key
interest were not collected by the Department of
Statistics until 1980, we have to focus our compar-
ative analyses between Hong Hong and Singapore
on the post-1980 period only, which restricts the
number of observations.
Method
We apply the autoregressive moving average (AR-
MA) model integrated with the generalized au-
toregressive conditional heteroscedastic (GARCH)
model to estimate the monthly number of new
business registrations in Hong Kong. This method
takes into account the special statistical proper-
ties of time series, as we discuss below, while
making it possible to specify both the mean and
variance effects of covariates in a single model.
A time series such as the registration data can
be understood as a collection of random variables
ordered according to the time they were observed.
It differs considerably from other randomly sam-
pled observations because the value in the past
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often affects the value in the future. This relation-
ship, called autocorrelation or serial correlation,
violates a critical assumption for ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions. This is essentially an
assumption of independence, but it rarely holds
for time series data. As a result, autocorrelation
plagues the estimated standard errors obtained
by the OLS. The structure of the autocorrela-
tion becomes the focus of most statistical models
trying to analyze time series data in an efficient
and robust way (Tsay 2005). Moreover, in order
for the OLS to be BLUE (best linear unbiased
estimation), it also requires an assumption of ho-
moscedasticity. This means that errors have to
be normally and independently distributed with
no change in the mean and variance:
εt ∼ NID(µ, σ).
Many time series data also violate this assump-
tion due to the varying impact of unobserved
factors over time. Yet sometimes the variance
per se draws substantive research interest, as
with the volatility in some financial data and
the possible fluctuations in levels of new business
formation discussed above in Proposition 3.
We combined the ARMA and GARCH esti-
mation to address the above two issues. The
ARMA model allows us to account for the depen-
dence of the series by using p autoregressive and
q moving average terms, whereas the GARCH
model analyzes the conditional variance of the
errors in a similar manner.
In the analysis, we attempted to isolate the
effects of the handover by using dummy variables
covering relevant periods. A first step in this
strategy involved modeling in the X vector so-
cioeconomic control variables that might affect
the business formation rate. These included the
logged total number of business registrations, the
logged GDP, the lending rate, a dummy for the
Asian crisis (October 1997 to August 1998), a
dummy for the global financial crisis (December
2007 to December 2012), a time trend (months
since 1975), and a dummy for the Chinese New
Year (March in each year). We then added, in
various specifications detailed below, to the X
vector dummy variables for the Joint Declaration
(December 1984) and the Post-Joint Declaration
period (January 1985 to March 2013, the last ob-
servation month), the handover (July 1997), and
the Post-handover period (August 1997 to March
2013). We also inserted a variable recording the
number of months elapsed since the handover. In
terms of Proposition 1, we expect that in mod-
eling business formation rates, the coefficients
associated with the Joint Declaration, the han-
dover, and their post- periods to be negative. In
line with Proposition 4, we expect the coefficients
associated with these variables to be positive
when modeling the organizational asset mobil-
ity ratio as the dependent variable. In terms of
Propositions 2 and 5, respectively, we expect the
variable recording the number of months elapsed
since the handover to be positive in the modeling
of business formations and negative in modeling
the organizational asset mobility ratio.
The ARMA(p, q) model incorporates the cor-
relation structure between εt and its lagged real-
izations in the following form:
εt =
p∑
i=1
ρiεt−i + at −
q∑
j=1
θjat−j (1)
Here ρ is the autocorrelation parameter and θ
is the moving-average parameter. at is a white
noise series following iid normal distribution with
zero mean and constant variance.
The conditional variance of εt can also be
incorporated into the specification. Specifically,
the conditional variance, E(ε2t |Xt−1) = σ2t , uses
past information on the Xs (Engle 1982). The
GARCH(m, k) for the conditional variance can
be specified as:
σ2t = γ0 +
m∑
i=1
γiε
2
t−i +
k∑
j=1
δjσ
2
t−j (2)
We can conceive the GARCH model as an ARMA
equivalent to the conditional variance of the dis-
turbances. Empirically, the conditional hetero-
scedasticity of errors in many time series can be
adequately estimated by the GARCH(1,1) model
(Tsay 2005).9 To explain the conditional vari-
ance σ2t other covariates can also be introduced
in Equation (2). This is a useful approach to
identifying the source of any volatility. We use
9The advantage of GARCH is that the generalized
component δj helps to update the variance more promptly
than the original ARCH specifications. As a result, fewer
parameters are required to achieve satisfactory fitness.
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it here in analyzing Proposition 3 by including
dummies for the Post-handover and Post-Joint
Declaration periods, which are predicted to show
positive coefficients.
For the reasons above, we chose the
ARMA(1,1) and GARCH(1,1) model to estimate
the monthly new business registrations in Hong
Kong and Singapore between 1975 and 2008. Po-
tentially we could use any of three different forms
of the dependent variable: the count of number
registered Yt, its first difference [yt−yt−1], or the
log transformation of this variable ln(yt). The
Dicky-Fuller test reveals that the first difference
is by itself a stationary process, whereas both
yt and ln(yt) are stationary with a positive time
trend.
We chose to use the count itself as the de-
pendent variable for two main reasons. First,
our research interest is focused on the level of
entrepreneurial activities in Hong Kong amid po-
litical transformation, and its variance over time.
The log-transformed data would artificially sup-
press volatility because it is informed by the rate
of growth or decline, rather than the actual ob-
servation. We do not want the estimates to be
affected heavily by the selected functional form
of the dependent variable.
Second, the count as dependent variable has
several advantages over the first difference in our
view. Not only is the count more straightforward
in interpretation, it also allows our model to have
a more flexible serial relationship between obser-
vations. That is, the combination of ARMA(1,1)
and GARCH(1,1) is a dynamic option to model
the serial relationship for yt and the conditional
variance of its errors, rather than forcing the
transformation in the form of first difference. We
thus use the count as the dependent variable.
The autocorrelation function (ACF) plot sug-
gests that the dependent variable is not serially
independent, which justifies our choice of autore-
gressive models. Based on the above discussion,
our regression model can be specified as:
Y = Xβ + ε (3)
In Equation (3), Y is the monthly business regis-
trations, X includes all the independent variables,
and the serial relationship of the error term ε and
its distribution follow Equations (1) and (2), re-
spectively.
Findings
Table 1 displays initial estimates of the effects of
the handover of Hong Kong’s sovereignty back
to the PRC. It gives estimates of the effects of
covariates on the number of newly registered cor-
porations in Hong Kong.
Model 1 offers a baseline test about the im-
pact of the transformation before and after July
1997. It shows that the monthly number of new
registrations exhibits a positive time trend, as
the Dickey-Fuller stationary test (Dickey and
Fuller, 1979) has shown. This trend operates af-
ter taking into account the potential time-varying
effects of other covariates such as total company
registrations, GDP, lending rate, and economic
fluctuations like the Asian crisis and the global
financial crisis. Among these variables, the total
number of company registrations, in its log trans-
formation with a one-month lag, has a negative
effect on the monthly change of new registra-
tions. This finding suggests diffusive competition
in an overcrowded market. As expected, GDP in
Hong Kong, an indicator of the overall volume of
business activities, encourages current new regis-
trations. Model 1 also indicates that the lending
rate, measuring the cost of financing, exhibits
no effect on our dependent variable. The period
of the Asian economic crisis did not affect Hong
Kong’s new business registrations, and new reg-
istrations became even more active during the
global financial crisis, likely due to the massive
stimulus packages in Hong Kong and mainland
China. Model 1 also captures the Chinese New
Year delay for business activities, which usually
catches up considerably in March.
Model 1 also presents the ARMA and GARCH
estimations, intended to identify the correlation
structure of the error term and its variance. We
see a positively significant AR(1) and a negatively
significant MA(1) process in the errors. Both
the ARCH(1) and GARCH(1) parameters are
positively significant. The ARMA and GARCH
parameters provide strong evidence of both se-
rial correlation and conditional heteroscedasticity
among the errors.
In order to assess the immediate and subse-
quent impact of the handover, an initial test of
Proposition 1, we use two binary variables: the
July 1997 single-month dummy and the Post-
handover dummy that spans August 1997 to
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Table 1: GARCH Estimates of Effects of Handover on New Business Registrations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Time (Months since Jan 1975) 61.965† 46.080† 47.264†
(3.712) (13.078) (13.369)
Handover (July 1997) −2477.019 −2594.850† −2514.657†
(1874.324) (636.406) (632.017)
Post-Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) −3885.086† −4053.415† −3882.851†
(334.841) (761.339) (731.988)
Months since Handover 18.495 20.506
(17.034) (15.222)
Ln Total Registrations t− 1 −5653.404† −4061.804† −4389.064†
(516.190) (1169.354) (1433.972)
Ln GDP t− 1 975.250† 930.817 1128.070
(318.711) (740.623) (788.947)
Lending Rate t− 1 5.875 −10.883 −10.157
(9.900) (11.173) (12.137)
Asian Crisis (Oct 1997-Aug 1998) 324.329 184.216 101.451
(252.229) (282.810) (136.498)
Global Financial Crisis (Dec 2007-Dec 2012) 2645.712† 3854.022 2996.737
(285.825) (2579.120) (2368.926)
Chinese New Year Effect 133.669 126.087† 123.196†
(78.787) (20.250) (22.757)
Constant 45281.990† 30419.976† 31858.265†
(3539.170) (10737.487) (11630.574)
ARMA
AR(1) 0.902† 0.913† 0.924†
(0.019) (0.033) (0.031)
MA(1) −0.687† −0.656† −0.679†
(0.049) (0.067) (0.061)
GARCH
ARCH(1) 0.763† 1.026† 0.845†
(0.089) (0.403) (0.334)
GARCH(1) 0.597† 0.507† 0.528†
(0.035) (0.112) (0.109)
Constant 1141.203 1594.339 7.592†
(1467.031) (1858.040) (0.807)
GARCH Covariate
Post Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) 3.689†
(1.062)
# of Obs 459 459 459
Log Likelihood −3668.178 −3666.608 −3662.844
† p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
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Figure 3: Monthly Count of Articles Mentioning “Handover” in SCMP
March 2013. Model 1 shows that new business
registrations experienced a steep drop in July
1997, although the large standard error makes it
not statistically significant. Although apparently
a reaction to uncertainty created by the han-
dover, we do not necessarily interpret the drop
as a severely pessimistic immediate response of
the business community to the transformation for
two reasons. First, both government agencies and
private sector entities likely shifted their priori-
ties and attention towards the political transition
and the related internal transformation in July
1997, thus neglecting some normal functions and
reducing operational efficiency. Such distraction
would likely negatively affect the number of busi-
ness registrations. Second, sentiments of both
anxiety and optimism struck strong notes at the
actual handover, and this strange context alone
could make potential entrepreneurs behave cau-
tiously. Opportunities do not need to be taken at
the very point when prevailing public sentiment
is most heated.
To track such sentiment, we counted the num-
ber of articles mentioning “handover” each month
in the South China Morning Post (SCMP), a
mainstream and popular English newspaper in
Hong Kong. (See Figure 3 for the plot.) In both
June and July of 1997, issues of the newspaper
contain greater than ten times the average men-
tions of other periods. Such temporal fluctuation
does not necessarily mean potential entrepreneurs
changed their fundamental beliefs about future
business prospects, but it could still have deterred
new registrations.
Compared to the July 1997 dummy, the com-
pany registration pattern in the post-handover
period is a more valid indicator regarding the sys-
tematic shift in the business environment. The
estimates in Model 1 suggest that, on average, the
number of new business registrations declined by
100 per month after the handover of Hong Kong’s
sovereign right, which is about 20.0 percent be-
low the expected level (constant) if there were
no transition. This finding gives strong support
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Table 2: GARCH Estimates of Effects of Source of Temporal Volatility on New Registrations
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Time (Months since Jan 1975) 21.738† 24.715† 29.495†
(2.669) (6.499) (7.267)
Joint Declaration (Dec 1984) 370.746 48.940
(223.567) (346.166)
Post-Joint Declaration (Jan 1985 – Mar 2013) 1200.640† 660.578
(302.967) (561.529)
Handover (July 1997) −1866.264† −1705.042† −1825.351†
(501.288) (613.488) (627.079)
Post-Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) −2935.232† −2694.341† −2878.369†
(683.898) (882.520) (1052.221)
Months since Handover 38.09† 40.684† 43.150†
(10.119) (14.742) (15.565)
Ln Total Registrations t− 1 −2198.604† −2490.074† −2922.166†
(115.440) (303.122) (367.871)
Ln GDP t− 1 748.752† 772.267 813.763
(203.834) (616.899) (530.759)
Lending Rate t− 1 5.123 5.479 5.141
(8.431) (13.863) (9.274)
Asian Crisis (Oct 1997-Aug 1998) 43.699 13.470 24.485
(140.206) (149.599) (164.925)
Global Financial Crisis (Dec 2007-Dec 2012) 3085.327 2624.092 2490.696†
(1947.346) (1780.710) (1264.053)
Chinese New Year Effect 113.956† 112.438† 114.295†
(9.804) (15.584) (15.835)
Constant 14657.842† 17252.240† 20995.731†
(1226.026) (3907.276) (4590.113)
ARMA
AR(1) 0.921† 0.946† 0.964†
(0.035) (0.046) (0.026)
MA(1) −0.689† −0.739† −0.765†
(0.062) (0.063) (0.055)
GARCH
ARCH(1) 1.041† 0.897† 0.943†
(0.250) (0.251) (0.263)
GARCH(1) 0.458† 0.41† 0.408†
(0.064) (0.090) (0.107)
Constant 5.285 6.875† 6.903†
(3.199) (2.036) (1.737)
GARCH Covariate
Post Joint Declaration (Jan 1985 – Mar 2013) 4.571† 4.783†
(1.890) (1.554)
Post Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) 6.031 0.559
(3.180) (0.773)
# of Obs 459 459 459
Log Likelihood −3652.492 −3644.606 −3648.293
† p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
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to Proposition 1, to the extent that the post-
handover impact is concerned, where we argued
that uncertainty over political assurance of prop-
erty rights and the supporting legal system would
discourage entrepreneurial activities.
Proposition 2 predicts that the decline in
business registrations should gradually attenu-
ate with time elapsed from the handover, given
political stability and enforcement of property
rights. Model 2 in Table 1 tests this proposition
by adding a clock variable (Months since han-
dover) that records the number of months since
the handover. The estimated coefficient indicates
that monthly new business registrations did not
catch up with the level of the previous decades,
although the net effect is still increasing when
we take into account the overall positive trend
of 46 per month since January 1975. Therefore,
Model 2 in Table 1 does not support Proposition
2. This finding suggests that the negative impact
of apparently diminishing property rights takes
longer to dissipate than we expected.
As argued in Proposition 3, political trans-
formation may not only matter to the average
founding rate of new businesses but may also
induce greater variation over time as optimism
waxes and wanes. We explored the possibility of
such an effect first in Model 3 of Table 1, then
specified more fine-tuned tests in Table 2. Model
3 in Table 1 presents a straightforward result
through the Post-handover dummy in the condi-
tional variance component of the GARCH model
(see Equation (3)). The estimated coefficient in-
dicates that the monthly number of new business
created displayed significantly greater variance
(second order) after the handover. This effect
may also help to explain the strong negative ef-
fect of the handover found in Model 2. Higher
fluctuation suggests a more volatile underlying
socioeconomic environment. If latent business
owners behave more conservatively amid such
business conditions, then we would expect to see
a lower average founding rate.
Nevertheless, the prediction in Proposition 3
is not limited to the post-handover period. As
documented above, anxiety obviously operated
before the transformation, when the public ex-
pressed serious concerns about property rights
and other relevant social economic rules. The pre-
determined nature of the political transformation
in Hong Kong made it a unique setting to test
whether and how such anxiety affects the volatil-
ity of new business foundings. In particular, the
Sino-British Joint Declaration in December 1984
made it clear that the Chinese government would
resume exercising sovereignty over Hong Kong
from July 1, 1997. Such a long window of ex-
pectation is rare among political transformations
of similar importance. With this motivation, we
added two additional dummy variables to the
analysis: Joint Declaration (December 1984) and
Post-Joint Declaration (January 1985 to March
2013). Table 2 presents the estimates.
Model 4 is the baseline estimate, which shows
that monthly new business registrations did not
change significantly in the month of the Joint
Declaration. The Post-Joint Declaration period
even exhibits a notable increase in new business
registrations. This indicates that Proposition 1
is not supported in terms of the negative impact
of the handover on business foundings prior to
July 1997.
But the pre-1997 impact of the handover’s an-
nouncement can be more clearly seen in the vari-
ance in business registrations. We included the
Post-Joint Declaration dummy in the GARCH
estimation in order to identify the origins of the
volatility observed for the post-handover period.
Model 5 exhibits the results. It shows that the
rate of new business founding experienced higher
variance after the Joint Declaration, yet the ac-
tual transformation in 1997 and afterwards did
nothing more than sustain such a level. This
means that the average monthly founding of new
businesses began to decrease after the handover,
yet it started exhibiting higher volatility much
earlier—starting with the Joint Declaration. On
one hand, this finding implies that higher volatil-
ity does not necessarily lead to more conservative
behavior as long as potential entrepreneurs hold
an optimistic view of the opportunities brought
by the transformation.
On the other hand, it also implies that people
tend to overestimate the benefit of a political
transformation and underestimate the inherent
risk it involves. When the change actually occurs,
a more realistic understanding of the business
environment corrects the “excess” entries accu-
mulated during the anticipatory period. Model 6
confirms this finding by summarizing the results
in a more succinct specification (by removing the
non-significant period effects). Altogether, the
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estimated results of our GARCH covariates from
Model 3 to Model 6 provide strong support to
Proposition 3.10 It is also worth mentioning that
Proposition 2 receives strong support in Table 2,
which improves the model fit significantly over
Table 1, and in which the monthly clock after
the handover becomes positively significant. This
means that entrepreneurial behavior rebounds
as anxiety about the potential negative conse-
quences of the handover falls from its peak and
confidence about the government’s pledge to pro-
tect property rights gains ground.
It is possible, however, that the patterns we
have identified in Hong Kong reflect other sweep-
ing social and economic forces affecting the Asian
region. The core issue is the counterfactual:
What would have happened in Hong Kong if
there had been no handover? While we can never
answer this question definitively, we can perhaps
get clues by looking at patterns in Singapore over
the same period. Singapore is a good comparison
to Hong Kong in terms of its GDP, per capita
income, market institutions, and position in the
global market. If powerful global or regional fac-
tors affected business formations in Hong Kong
during this period, they would likely have affected
Singapore as well.
Table 3 presents the comparison between Hong
Kong and Singapore. Because major economic in-
dicators were not systematically collected before
1980 in Singapore, we only focus on the period
between 1980 and 2013. Models 7 to 9 replicate
the analysis in Table 2 for this shorter period,
which indicates no substantive changes to the
earlier findings for Hong Kong. Models 10 to
10In order to further verify our propositions, we tried
another dependent variable: the first difference of the log
transformation of the monthly new business registrations,
commonly used as a proxy to the rate of change in time
series analysis. It is worth mentioning that each new
registration by nature follows an arrival process; thus
whether the rate of change is meaningful or not relies
heavily on the time intervals used for aggregation. Also, as
we mentioned earlier, the log transformation may suppress
the volatility of the monthly count, one of our key research
interests. Nevertheless, we were still curious about the
period effect of this dependent variable and its volatility
over time. Supplemental Appendix 2 presents the results.
It is shown that our estimation exhibits no clear period
effect on this variable, yet its volatility closely follows
the pattern identified in Table 2. This finding boosts our
confidence that new entrepreneurial activities experienced
higher volatility from the Joint Declaration, much earlier
than the actual political handover.
12 show the GARCH analysis estimates for new
business formation in Singapore. These estimates
suggest that historical changes in the business en-
vironments of Hong Kong and Singapore followed
different patterns. Taking new registrations for
example, entrepreneurial activities in Singapore
became less active after the Joint Declaration,
but in Hong Kong entrepreneurship did not expe-
rience a decline until the July 1997 handover, at
which point the decline was of much greater mag-
nitude. Furthermore, the GARCH estimation
shows no effect by the Sino-British Joint Dec-
laration on the volatility of business formation
in Singapore, but greater volatility after July
1997. In Hong Kong, this volatility increased
with the Joint Declaration. Overall, the diver-
gent patterns that the comparison between Hong
Kong and Singapore shows give us an additional
layer of confidence in our inferences about the
propositions.
Regarding the legal format of new business
registrations, we argued in Proposition 4 that
companies might prefer to establish their Hong
Kong business entity as a foreign branch rather
than as a local company or subsidiary due to
the former’s greater asset liquidity and profit
mobility—significant advantages when anticipat-
ing a political handover to a polity with a different
value system regarding property rights. Given
data limitations, we cannot tell whether a foreign
branch actually comes from a particular foreign
parent company (including ones from mainland
China), because almost every local citizen can
setup a non-local entity and use it as the par-
ent company to build a branch in Hong Kong.
However, the longitudinal change in the ratio of
newly registered foreign branches to overall new
registrations (what we call the organizational as-
set mobility ratio) would still inform us about
the shift of preference among business people.
With respect to Proposition 4, we argued
that the organizational asset mobility ratio would
likely increase after the handover. Table 4 presents
estimates related to this argument.
Model 13 tests Proposition 4 in a basic
GARCH regression. We used the normalized or-
ganizational mobility asset ratio as the dependent
variable; the independent variables include only
the most straightforward ones, such as the lagged
organizational asset mobility ratio, the event and
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Table 4: GARCH Estimates of Effects of Handover on Organizational Asset Mobility Ratio
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15
Organizational Asset Mobility Ratio t− 1 0.872† 0.879† 0.864†
(0.078) (0.068) (0.068)
Time (Months since Jan 1975) 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Joint Declaration (Dec 1984) 0.546† 0.319
(0.269) (0.211)
Post-Joint Declaration (Jan 1985 – Mar 2013) −0.046 −0.028
(0.057) (0.048)
Handover (July 1997) 0.396† 0.404† 0.385†
(0.126) (0.140) (0.126)
Post-Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) 0.116 0.096 0.107
(0.061) (0.053) (0.056)
Months since Handover −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ln Total Registrations t− 1 0.218 0.169 0.239
(0.227) (0.149) (0.149)
Ln GDP t− 1 −0.175 −0.197 −0.305
(0.309) (0.231) (0.209)
Lending Rate t− 1 −0.000 0.003 0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004)
Asian Crisis (Oct 1997-Aug 1998) −0.039 −0.029 −0.024
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
Global Financial Crisis (Dec 2007-Dec 2012) −0.003 0.016 0.016
(0.042) (0.037) (0.039)
Chinese New Year Effect −0.116 −0.153† −0.128
(0.076) (0.075) (0.074)
Constant −1.180 −0.498 −0.331
(1.061) (0.982) (0.931)
ARMA
AR(1) 0.123 0.123 0.121
(0.099) (0.084) (0.079)
MA(1) −0.739† −0.740† −0.716†
(0.135) (0.116) (0.107)
GARCH
ARCH(1) 0.213 0.127† 0.146
(0.133) (0.063) (0.076)
GARCH(1) 0.546† 0.056 0.061
(0.247) (0.285) (0.217)
Constant 0.039 −1.414† −1.422†
(0.031) (0.408) (0.327)
GARCH Covariate
Post Joint Declaration (Jan 1985 – Mar 2013) −0.929† −1.118†
(0.271) (0.247)
Post Handover (Aug 1997 – Mar 2013) −0.326
(0.205)
# of Obs 459 459 459
Log Likelihood −203.357 −181.095 −183.497
† p < 0.05 (two-tailed tests).
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Figure 4: Total Non-local Registrations by Country of Origin (Note: Count of all other countries
includes registratons from Mainland China)
period dummies, the time trend,11 and the ba-
sic GARCH specifications. The estimated model
suggests that there is indeed a significant increase
in the ratio after the handover, as predicted by
Proposition 4.
It is possible that this increase in the propor-
tion of non-local branches may be driven simply
by an inflow of companies from mainland China,
who took the transition in Hong Kong as a change
favorable to their advantage. Unfortunately, we
do not have the registration breakdown by coun-
try at monthly intervals. Nevertheless, the yearly
plots in Figures 4 and 5 suggest that companies
from mainland China are not the primary drivers.
Although the PRC number exhibits remarkable
growth after 1997, the magnitude is smaller than
that of the growth from offshore islands and other
foreign countries except the United States and the
11Although the Dickey Fuller test indicates that the
time series of the organizational asset mobility ratio is
stationary without a trend, we still included an overall
time trend to make sure that the results are comparable
to the analysis of monthly new business registrations in
Tables 1 through 3.
United Kingdom. Firms coming from tax havens
like the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Is-
lands, and Panama, are especially noteworthy
because their presence grew by more than ten-
fold between the early 1990s and 2008. While we
have no effective way to identify even the rough
proportion contributed by mainland China firms,
it is also obvious that the offshore islands are well
positioned for protecting and even hiding wealth.
Such advantages should resonate with the anxiety
in Hong Kong regarding property rights.
Proposition 5 argues that over time entre-
preneurs would make more accurate judgments
based on the track record of the new regime; thus
the registration ratio between local firms and
foreign branches should become more balanced
with time after the handover. The estimated
result does not support this prediction, as time
since the handover shows no significant effect.
This non-finding may result from the minimal cost
involved in setting up a foreign corporation for
greater asset mobility. Model 14, which included
the Post-Joint Declaration and Post-handover
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Figure 5: New Business Registrations in Hong Kong from Mainland China
dummies in the GARCH specification, continues
to show support for Proposition 4. The volatility
of the ratio also declines steadily after the Joint
Declaration. This trend might be driven partially
by the fact that there were quite few new foreign
branches each month before 1984. The robustness
of these findings is further verified in Model 15,
where the non-significant Post-Joint Declaration
period dummy is excluded in the main covariates
and the Post-handover dummy in the GARCH
estimation. Overall, Proposition 4 receives strong
support, but we find no evidence for Proposition
5.
Discussion
Political transformations can affect business dy-
namics in profound ways, but the mechanisms by
which this occurs have not been studied as much
as their impact on society warrants. Political
change will often seem to some extent idiosyn-
cratic, as will its effects on the organizational
landscape, but systematic processes that research
can uncover are also surely at work. Accordingly,
we assessed the Hong Kong handover not only
because this important, unique global event de-
serves attention in its own right, but also because
it provides a window through which we might
better understand how political transformation
affects business formation and other economic
activity.
The Hong Kong handover stands out among
political transformations because it was expected
to happen and its precise timing was known well
in advance. As the analysis shows, this did not
mean there was no politically induced uncertainty.
In fact, anxiety in Hong Kong waxed and waned,
going from sheer optimism about its future un-
der Chinese rule to public media proclamations
about “The Death of Hong Kong” in 1995 (For-
tune 1995). In this study, we found patterns in
business registration data that reflect these fluc-
tuations, in addition to registration rates that
were lower in the period following the handover
than would have been expected without it.
The findings also suggest that after the han-
dover non-locally registered firms with greater
sociological science | www.sociologicalscience.com 392 September 2014 | Volume 1
Carroll, Feng, and Kuilman The Handover in Hong Kong
asset mobility proliferated in greater numbers
than did local ventures and subsidiaries.
Of course, it would be naïve to expect similar
patterns to occur in all cases where a political
transformation is expected to happen. Consider
the shorter period between the fall of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989 and the official reunifi-
cation of East and West Germany in October
1990. Fier and Woywode (1994) demonstrated
that business foundings in East Germany actually
started to increase monotonically in the inter-
vening period, peaking shortly before the actual
reunification and showing little evidence of sig-
nificant variance in founding rates. As Fier and
Woywode (1994) noted, “the growing indepen-
dence from plans and ideologies improves the
development of more efficient and decentralized
economic structures.” Whereas in Hong Kong
concerns about uncertainty alternated with op-
timism about improved opportunities, in East
Germany the arrival of new business opportu-
nities was so swift and clear that it dominated
reaction to the change of polity. It may be that a
longer period is required for oscillations to occur
between the announcement of a political trans-
formation and its actual implementation. Longer
periods of time are almost by definition subject
to more preparations, negotiations, and political
jostling among parties involved. This behavior
also fuels speculation among the general pub-
lic as to what the implications of the political
transformation will be.
The conceptual framework we developed here
nevertheless helps to analyze the overall impact
of a political transformation on business forma-
tion: whether or not the security of potential
entrepreneurs’ property rights is improved (or
can be expected to improve) corresponds with
whether opportunity-driven business formation
or politically induced uncertainty will dominate
the society’s response to the change of polity.
A corollary holds that the dominating force de-
pends on the demographic size of the various
bases affected by the political change. For in-
stance, even if property rights are not guaranteed,
opportunity-driven business formation can still
dominate if a greater proportion of the popula-
tion obtains beneficial treatment than had been
the case before.
Theory building along these lines, in conjunc-
tion with deeper empirical examination of histori-
cal cases of discontinuous political change, would
contribute to a general understanding of how
political transformation affects corporate demog-
raphy. To this end, other aspects of dynamics at
both the organizational and subunit levels need
to be examined, such as organizational growth
and change and employee mobility patterns. We
look forward to studying such issues in future
research.
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